

CIAOCI SNWECIO 750212

Approved For Release 2001/09/13 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000400120028-6

West. Europe, [REDACTED], Interna. Organ.

S/NFD/CD


1 of 1

12 Feb 75

No. 0130-75

**Secret**

*No Foreign Dissem*



# STAFF NOTES:

## Western Europe

25X6

## International Organizations

**Secret**

118

No. 0130-75  
February 12, 1975

*CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY*

**Warning Notice**

**Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved**

**NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION**

**Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions**

**Classified by 005827**

**Exempt from general declassification schedule  
of E. O. 11652, exemption category:**

**§ 5B (1), (2), and (3)**

**Automatically declassified**

**on: Date Indeterminable to Determine**

25X6

WESTERN EUROPE — [REDACTED] — INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

This publication is prepared for regional specialists in the Washington community by the Western Europe Division, Office of Current Intelligence, with occasional contributions from other offices within the Directorate of Intelligence. Comments and queries are welcome. They should be directed to the authors of the individual articles.

CONTENTS

Teams Set Up In Portugal to Work in Army . . .	1
EC's Dialogue of the Deaf with CEMA . . . . .	2-3
New Government in Denmark . . . . .	4
Turkish Reaction to US Aid Halt . . . . .	5-6

February 12, 1975

-i-

SECRET

25X1A

[REDACTED]  
Phone: 143-5135Teams Set Up In Portugal to Work in Army

The Portuguese Armed Forces Movement's weekly bulletin announced today the formation of special "internal information and public relations teams" to strengthen morale in the army and to explain the Movement's policies to the troops. The announcement acknowledges for the first time that the Movement does not command unanimous support in the military and admits the army is "not easily accepting" the consequences of last April's coup.

The announcement said these teams, composed of "ordinary soldiers and possibly civilians," will be empowered to interpret army directives and accompany commanders to regional army meetings. While it is still too early to make any firm judgments on this development, it has the earmarks of the establishment of a political commissar system.

Command-rank officers, in any case, will not appreciate this type of interference and it is likely that the order, if implemented, will widen the differences that exist between some members of the Movement and the majority of the armed forces.

It is also possible that a majority of the Movement's members will not support this order. The responsibility for the publication of the weekly bulletin has been in the hands of more radical elements of the Movement, and it is possible that on this occasion they may have overstepped their authority.

Debate within the military, meanwhile, continues over the future role of the Armed Forces Movement in Portuguese politics. There are rumors that the Movement will be reorganized to take a formal place in the government.  
(Confidential)

February 12, 1975

-1-

SECRET

25X1A

Phone: 143-5205

25X1A

Phone: 143-7285

EC's Dialogue of the Deaf with CEMA

The first official meeting between EC Commission and CEMA officials in Moscow ended last week in disarray. The session confirmed for the EC the disparate nature of the two organizations, but even Commission officials were surprised by the stubbornness, secretiveness, and poor preparations on the CEMA side.

The Soviets had looked on the meeting, billed as preparation for a visit to Moscow by Commission president Ortoli, as Western recognition of equality between the community and CEMA. Moscow could then hope to delay or circumvent implementation of EC control of trade with the various East European states by demanding that commerce be governed by EC-CEMA agreements. At the same time, Moscow could use CEMA's enhanced international status to promote closer economic integration within the East European bloc. The Soviets have been having trouble getting the Romanians as well as other East Europeans to sanction an unlimited negotiating mandate for CEMA's secretary general.

At the three-day Moscow session, the two sides talked past each other, with the CEMA group--characterized by one EC official as "unimpressive aging bureaucrats"--concentrating single-mindedly on trying to arrange a schedule for Ortoli's visit and the Commission delegation attempting to get a dialogue going on such areas of possible EC-CEMA cooperation as standardization, environmental protection, and statistics. The Commission is anxious to discuss technical areas in order to underline its view that CEMA has authority here but has no jurisdiction comparable to the EC over trade policy.

February 12, 1975

-2-

SECRET

However disappointed Commission officials are by the meager results of the trip to Moscow, they feel they at least forestalled a "disastrous" visit by Ortoli and gained useful insights into the workings of CEMA. They believe they also made clear that CEMA members must deal directly and individually with the Commission in areas where it represents community policy.

CEMA remains publicly committed to establishing links with the EC and will probably take up the Commission invitation to send experts to Brussels to continue the discussions. Soviet media have already begun to restructure the facts of the EC-CEMA meeting in order to meet the USSR's political objectives. *Izvestia*, for example, claimed that the session had been "useful" and that "progress was achieved in preparations for a proposed meeting of the leaders of the two organizations."

The EC, despite its near contempt for CEMA, will also seek to develop a dialogue. Public opinion in the community, in the view of a Commission official, would not allow the EC to ignore CEMA overtures. More important, perhaps, is the EC desire to avoid any snub that could complicate community efforts to reach bilateral arrangements with CEMA members. (Confidential No Foreign Dissem)

February 12, 1975

SECRET

25X1A

Phone: 143-6884

New Government in Denmark

After weeks of negotiations, Social Democratic leader Anker Jorgensen has succeeded in forming a single-party minority government.

Jorgensen, who was prime minister in 1972 and 1973, tried earlier to form a majority government but he failed because of the fragmentation of the Danish political scene and deep-seated economic differences among the parties. His second chance came after outgoing Prime Minister Poul Hartling's efforts to put together a four-party, center-right minority coalition were blocked at the last minute by maverick Progressive Party leader Mogens Glistrup.

With only 53 of the 179 seats in parliament, Jorgensen will have to depend on the tacit support of the other socialist parties and at least one non-socialist party. The socialist parties will back Jorgensen, but the support of the non-socialist parties will depend on the issue under consideration.

The Jorgensen government will not have the solid parliamentary support or the longevity to come to grips with Denmark's critical economic problems. Jorgensen may have to shelve his party's radical economic proposals and adopt a watered down version of Hartling's plan in order to survive.

The new government will not support US policies to the degree that the Hartling government did. There may be a slight shift to the left on foreign policy matters, but there will not be a radical change in the US-Danish relationship. Membership in NATO will remain the basis of Danish security policy. (Confidential)

February 12, 1975

SECRET



25X1A

[REDACTED]  
Phone: 143-5413Turkish Reaction to US Aid Halt

The Turkish government today reiterated its warning that all defense agreements with the US will be subject to renegotiation unless military equipment deliveries to Turkey are resumed. The Turks reportedly are prepared to wait until the end of the month, however, before taking any retaliatory moves against the US.

The Turks have also officially informed NATO of the problems the US action will cause Turkey in carrying out its obligations to the alliance, and asked the Defense Planning Committee to conduct an investigation in the effects the "US arms embargo" will have on defense in the eastern Mediterranean. Turkey's ambassador to NATO also informed his US counterpart that he had been instructed to consult with other allied governments on the apparent application of the "embargo" to items purchased with NATO infrastructure funds when a US manufacturer was the main contractor. The Turks reportedly have reacted to this situation by suspending payments to US contractors on infrastructure projects in Turkey.

25X1X

[REDACTED]  
that in meetings late last week senior military and government officials agreed to defer any decision on retaliatory action against the US to see if military assistance could be restored. In the meantime, it was decided to send emissaries to the other NATO countries to explain Turkey's position and to determine whether these countries could provide equipment and spare parts.

The Turkish government is also attempting to assess the depth of public sentiment in favor of retaliatory measures against the US and to monitor

February 12, 1975

SECRET

SECRET

25X1C

the activities of such groups as university students, government employees, and unions who might seek to protest actively. [REDACTED] 25X1C [REDACTED] reports that one group, the Turkish Teachers Association, is planning anti-American demonstrations on February 15 in provinces where US installations are located. Such demonstrations are likely to be closely watched by Turkish security officials, and in those provinces where martial law is still in force, they may be cancelled.

The Turkish foreign ministry has used the risk of anti-American incidents to turn aside a US embassy request for a visit by two US naval vessels to a Turkish port. Although the foreign ministry's action was not an outright rejection of the request on political grounds, it was clearly a retaliatory move, with other such steps likely to follow. (Secret No Foreign Dissem/Background Use Only/Controlled Dissem)

February 12, 1975

SECRET